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GOD, FREEDOM, AND GRACE
Reflections on the Essentiality of Atheism for Marx and Marxism

1

by Miroslav Volf
Dr. Miroslav Volf (Pentecostal Evangelical Church) is a professor of systematic
theology at the Evangelical Theological School in Osijek, Yugoslavia. He is a
graduate of that school and received his Ph.D. degree at the Evangelisch Theologische
Fakultat in Tiibingen, West Germany. He was a lecturer at the Fuller Theological
Seminary in California and has lectured widely throughout the world. This article
was first published in the Neue Zeitschrift fiir Systematische Theologie und
Religionsphilosophie ed. by Oswald Bayer, Verlag de Gruyter, Berlin and New York,
Vol. 3 1 ( 1 989). pp. 2 1 3 -229. Used by permission of the author and publisher.

Whether atheism is essential for Marxism is one of the key questions in the Marxist
Christian dialogue.

Both Christian theologians and Marxist philosophers have written

extensively about this problem. Unless they belong to the dogmatically-minded segment of
either group, they tend to deny the essentiality of atheism for Marxism. After long years of
mutual denunciation, a growing consensus of open- minded Christians and Marxists on such
a significant question is a hopeful sign. But if the unanimity is not to be short-lived, it is
necessary to investigate carefully to what extent Marxists (or Christians) are true to Marx
when they maintain that atheism is not essential to Marxism.
By raising this question I do not intend to suggest that Marxists should feel bound to the
letter of Marx' texts. But neither should one assume that Marxism can disregard the thought
of its founder without losing its own identity. For this reason I believe that the success of
the Marxist-Christian dialogue depends partly on the ability of both parties to differentiate
consciously and carefully between what Marx actually said and what marxists are ready or
not ready to accept.

Without such differentiation the tendency is to sweep Marx'

unacceptable theses conveniently under the carpet.

The foolishness of such a procedure

becomes obvious, of course, at the first spring cleaning. It is necessary to deal first with the
problem of the essentiality of atheism in Marx' thought and then to state clearly to what
extent an for what reasons one should or should not follow Marx.

1 I want to thank my colleague, Dr. Gerald Shenk, at the Biblical-Theological Institute,
Zagreb/Osijek (Yugoslavia) for his valuable comments on some previous versions of this study.
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Marxists must define how they identify with or differ from Marx. As a theologian I
want to contribute to this process of self -definition by critically examining the place of
atheism in the thought of Marx himself. My purpose is not to give a comprehensive analysis
of Marx' views on atheism and Christianity, but to deal mainly with those aspects of his
critique of religion that are essentially linked to his theory of alienation and emancipation.
A gainst the thesis that Marx' atheism can best be explained by the negative social influence
of Christianity, I will argue first directly and then indirectly that the foundation of Marx'
atheism lies in his anthropology (II and V) and answer two of the most common objections
to such view (III and IV). In the last part I will draw some conclusions about when it is
acceptable from a Christian perspective to talk about Christians that are Marxists or Marxists
that are Christians (VI).

But before embarking on an analysis of Marx' thought it is

necessary to define the main terms discussed and note the reasons for a new investigation of
the topic(!).
I
( I ) It is impossible to give a meaningful answer to the question whether atheism is
essential to Marxism without defining the central terms of the question. They are equivocal
both in what they connote and what they denote. As for connotations, the terms "atheism"
and "Marxism" are in some circles potent pseudo-religious symbols. Their emotional charge
makes the investigation of Marxist atheism a risky endeavor. Since the risk can be avoided
only by remaining silent, however, I ask the reader to distinguish carefully between the
subjective connotations the terms may have for the reader and what they denote objectively
for this author.
The term Marxism does not stand here for dialectical materialism as a closed materialistic
world-view of either Engels', Lenin's or Stalin's type, but for a humanistically oriented
analysis and theory of society. This I also take to be the main thrust of Marx' thought.
A theism in this study signifies a view that is incompatible with the conscious affirmation that
a personal God, Creator and Redeemer of the world, exists. It includes active anti-theism,
indifferent theoretical atheism, and a-theism as the absence of God-consciousness. When it
is necessary to differentiate between mere methodological atheism and atheism that is
incompatible with the objective existence of God, I use instead of "atheism" the term
metaphysical atheism. Finally, I call those characteristics essential without a phenomenon
cannot exist without losing its identity.
(2) The fundamental importance of Marx' and Marxist atheism for the Marxist-Christian
dialogue stems from the fact that the question whether atheism is essential for Marx and
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Marxism is the flip side of the question whether the Christian faith is essentially alienating. 2
Marx' atheism is a challenge not only to the intellectual· but also the moral integrity of
Christians. It is thus imperative to investigate whether Marx' critique of religion is directed
against every form of Christianity which does not want to deny its own identity and to what
extent Marx' critique of religion is j ustified (whether it is pertinent only to some historical
forms of Christianity or to the essence of Christianity). But the question of Marx' atheism
is important also for Marxists for similar reasons.

To the extent that Marx' critique of

Christianity is mistaken (or at least is not justified for every form of Christianity), the
question whether atheism is essential for Marx is at the same time a question whether Marx'
thought is essentially alienating. For if Marx' (unjustified) atheism is an integral aspect of
his h umanism, then Marx' thought essentially contributes to human alienation.
Much, however, has already been written about the important topic of Marx' atheism.
Why another study? First, there are reasons of a purely scholarly nature for a reexamination
of Marx' atheism. The thesis that I will defend is not new, but it is unpopular among both
open- minded Christians and Marxists.

Of more than twenty representative authors who

wrote about Marx' atheism in a recent and laudable edition of the Journal of Ecumenical
Studies, 3 only a small minority agrees with my position. Hence the need to respond to
objections raised against the thesis and to reinforce it with additional arguments.
A second reason for a reexamination of Marx' atheism is found in the recent religious
and political developments in countries where the Communist Party is at the helm.
Beginning with the People's Republic of China in the mid-seventies, 4 almost all socialist
societies (some more and some less cautiously) have started implementing the policy of open
hand toward religion, which is an integral part of a general economic, political and cultural
opening of these societies. At the same time it is becoming apparent that secularization in
socialist societies is not advancing as fast as Communists had hoped and Christians feared.
As sociological investigations show, it slowed down, possibly even halted, giving way to the
process of the revitalization of religion. 5 These political and religious developments might
be trends of a short or long duration, but in any case they demand that the dialogue between

2Cf. Arthur F. McGovern, "Atheism :Is It EssentialTo Marxism?" JES, 22 ( 1 985), 499.
3 JES, 22 ( I 985), no. 3 , ed. Paul Mojzes.
4 Cf. Orlando E. Costas, "The Experience of God in the New China", The Judson Bulletin 6
( 1 987), 4 l ff.
5Cf. Srdjan Vrcan, Od krize religi je k religi ji krize. Prilog raspravi o religi ji u uvjetima
suvremene krize [From Crisis of Religion to Religion of Crisis. A Contribution to the Discussion
on Religion in the Conditions of the Contemporary Crisis], Zagreb, 1 986, 1 56 .
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Christians and Marxists which was carried on in the late fifties and sixties be revived. In this
dialogue the question of atheism will be central and Marx' views on it pivotal.
It could be objected that the investigation of atheism in Marx' and Marxist thought is
more or less irrelevant to the problems of the social co-existence of Christians and Marxists.
The key question, one can argue, is not whether (or to what extent) atheism is a logically
necessary component of Marx' and Marxist thought, but whether Marxists will continue to
insist on atheism in the foreseeable future. 6 This indeed is the key question but not the only
important one. Having learned something from Marx about the influence of social reality
on thought, I believe that in most cases political reasons contribute decisively both to the
insistence that atheism is essential to Marxism (by most Communist Parties in power) and to
the concession that it is accidental to Marxism (by most Communist Parties which are
fighting for power). Hence it is necessary to analyze the practical reasons for clinging to
essentiality or for advocating accidentality of atheism for Marxism. But such a task does not
make the present investigation of the place of atheism in Marx' and Marxist thought
superfluous. Unlike dogmatically minded Marxists I believe that the relation between social
reality and thought cannot adequately be described as the (ultimately)

unilateral

determination of thought by social reality. It is to be expected that the quality of Christians'
and Marxists' co-existence will be influenced significantly by their attitudes about the place
of atheism in Marx' and Marxist thought.

II
Many open-minded Marxist philosophers and Christian theologians advocate the view
that Marx' critique of religion "pertains exclusively to its social function." 7 For Marx religion
is problematic only insofar as it prevents integral human liberation. Correspondingly, it is
believed that Marx' atheism does not deny every god (especially not the one true God), but
only the god of the dominant historical forms of Christianity with which Marx was familiar
in the nineteenth century. Marx' universal atheistic declarations, it is claimed, rest on an
illicit generalization about every god on the basis of ideas of god that were familiar to him.
If this generalization is the main source of Marx' atheism, then the god Marx denies and the

6Cf. Quentin Lauer, "Response Occasioned by McGovern's Atheism: Is it Essential to Marxism?,"
JES, 22 ( 1 98 5), 524.
7Nikola Skledar and Mislav Kukoc, "Toward a Critique of the Marxian Criticism of Religion,"
in The Conrad Grebel Review 3 ( 1 985), 9 1 ; differently Nikola Skledar, Urn i religija: Uvod u teorije
religije [Mind and Religion. An Introduction into Theories of Religion], Sarajevo/Zadar, 1 986,32.
18

God Christians affirm are different gods; 8 then also the expectation is justified that marxists
will revise their critique of religion if it is shown that the notion of god that Marx criticizes
does not correspond to the reality of the Christian God.
The way in which the young Marx embraced atheism, however, suggests that such an
interpretation of his atheism is incorrect. The correspondence of Marx at seventeen with his
father shows that "the reasons for Marx' change to atheism were not of a moral nature, which
is frequently the case with young people, nor was it caused by a sociopolitical rebellion
against reactionary Christianity of that time, but it was due to serious personal reasons of an
intellectual and emotional nature."9 But Marx need not have remained an atheist for the
same reasons he became one. The decisive argument against the claim that Marx' atheism
denies only the god of reactionary forms of Christianity is to be sought elsewhere. I suggest
that the conflict between Marx and the Christian faith stems primarily from the fact that
they operate with a different understanding of the agent of human liberation. Marx raises
the objection not only that in the Christian faith God (allegedly) hinders human liberation
and the realization of human potentialities. Even if Marx were faced with indubitable proofs
that belief in God functioned as a stimulus to human liberation, this would not be a
sufficient reason for Marx to abandon atheism. For every liberation action of God implies
an experience of God's grace. This is unacceptable to Marx because he maintained that a
person who lives through the grace of another is a dependent, and thus an unfree, being. 10
Christian faith is thus problematic for Marx not only because it impedes needed social
changes, but also because it does not insist on human being s as the exclusive agents of their
own emancipation.
Marx' polemic against God's grace, which is the cornerstone of the Christian faith,
clearly shows that atheism is essential to Marx' humanism and consequently to his theory of
emancipation. Marx defines emancipation from the outset as liberation from God, whether
or not God functions as a cunningly disguised enemy or a manifest friend of human beings.
To think that Marx' critique of religion ends with the "categorical imperative to overthrow
all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken despicable being" 11 is to misread

8Cf. Torno Veres, Filozofsko-teoloski di jalog s Marxom: Misao i praksa u d jelu Karla Marxa
[The Philosophical-Theological Dialogue with Marx: Thought and Practice in the Work of Karl
Marx], Zagreb, 1 98 1 , 269.
9Tomo Veres, "The Ambivalence of Marx' Atheism," JES, 22 ( 1 985), 552-553.
1°Karl Marx, "Oekonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke,
Berlin, 1 977, Erganzungsband I, 544.
11Karl Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels,
Werke, Berlin, 1 977, I, 3 8 5 .
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Marx. He explicitly states that it ends with "the teaching that man is the highest being for
man", or, differently stated, that "the root of man is man himself." 12 Marx' categorical
imperative follows ("hence"! 13 ) from this radically atheistic thesis.
There is one important anthropological notion of Marx which seems to deaden the
sharpness of his polemic against God's grace.

If developed by Marxists, it could prove

valuable in the Christian-Marxist dialogue. It is his belief that human existence is always
partly a result of grace. 14 At first glance it might seem that the text in Economic
Philosophical Manuscripts in which Marx polemicizes against God's grace refers to the
individual and his self-constitution ("A being is independent...A man who lives by the grace
of another...and I live completely . . . "1 5). In that case all human dependence would be
anthropologically unacceptable. But the context makes it clear the Marx does not think of
the individual, but of "man" in the generic sense. An individual human being does not "owe"
his existence to himself, but to "man."1 6 To owe one's existence (first to one's parents and
then to the whole human race) is to have it through graceP Given this acceptance of grace
by Marx, it would seem that a Marxist anthropology that does not want to stray away form
Marx' path but dares to modify some aspects of his thought could accept the thesis that
human beings can live as free and unalienated beings in relation to a loving God who created
them.
III
Two basic objections can be raised against the argument that atheism is essential in Marx'
thought, given his polemic against God's grace. One can object ( 1 )that it disregards the fact
that Marx' humanism presupposes the erroneous competitive understanding of the relation
between God and human beings, and (2)that Marx' polemic should not be understood as an
expression of metaphysical but only methodological atheism.

I will examine these two

objects in the present and the following section.

12 Ibid. [Italics mine.]
13 Ibid.
14Cf. on that problem Miroslav Volf, "Zukunft der Arbeit-Arbeit der Zukunft.
Das
Arbeitsverstandnis bei Karl Marx und seine theologische Wertung," Miinchen/Mainz, 1 988, [ ?].
15Karl Marx, "Oekonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte," in op.cit., 544.
16Ibid., 545.
17A similar idea is expressed more concretely in German Ideology (cf. Karl Marx/Friedrich
Engels, "Die deutsche Ideologie," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin, 1 977, III, 25).
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Like the young Engels, 18 Marx combines his fundamentally atheistic anthropological
thesis that human beings are the highest beings for themselves with Feuerbach's
understanding of the relationship between God and human beings. 19 According to
Feuerbach, God and human beings stand in a relation of inverted proportion: the more
qualities human beings invest through faith in God, the fewer qualities remain for
themselves. It follows that human beings develop integrally only if God does not exist. 20
Since Marx adopted the Feuerbachian dichotomy between God and human beings, if he
decided in favor of human liberation 'he had to decide against God. Thus, some philosophers
and theologians have concluded, the Feuerbachian dichotomy "is the ultimate foundation of
Marx' atheism." 21
If this interpretation of Marx' atheism is correct, then his atheism rests again on an
erroneous generalization. Only now this generalization is. not based on a particular historical
form of Christianity but on a particular philosophical understanding of the genesis of
religious ideas in the human mind. Since in the biblical revelation God and human beings
are partners and not competitors over a set amount of desirable attributes, 2 2 Feuerbach's view
of the creation of religious ideas is not applicable in this case. But even without Feuerbach's
theory of projection Marx' polemic against God's grace remains.

This polemic is not

logically dependent on the theory of projection (although it is necessary to the theory of
projection), and is based on an aspect of Marx' anthropology that he developed under the
influence of Fichte.
In accordance with his understanding of the absolute I, Fichte maintained that for the
individual human I is nothing more "unbearable then only to exist . . . for someone and
through someone else." 23 A human being can be free only if he is "his own creation," if he

18 Cf. Friedrich Engels, "Die Lage Englands," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke, Berlin,
1 977, I, 543.
19Cf. Karl Marx, "Okonomische-philosophische Manuskripte, in op.cit., 520; Karl Marx,
"Ausziige aus James Mills Buch 'Elemens d'economie politique'," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels,
Werke, Berlin, 1 977, Erganzungsband I, 466.
2 °Cf. Ludwig Feuerbach, Samtliche Werke, ed. by Wilhelm Bolin, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1 96 1 ,
VI, I ff.
21 Arthur F. McGovern, op.cit., 534; cf. Jose Miguez Bonino, "Atheism:
Marxism?" JES, 22 ( 1 985), 537.

Is it Essential to

2 2Cf.,for instance, the biblical understanding of work as co-operation with God (Miroslav Volf,
op.cit.).

(

2 3Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Samtliche Werke, ed. by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Berlin, 1 845/46,
II, 249.
21

is "absolutely independent, and through himself perfect and complete." 2 4
important difference between Fichte's and Marx'

There is an

understanding of freedom and

independence. Marx is not pleading for a complete independence of human beings from
their human and non-human environment.

Such an independence would contradict his

materialistic understanding of human beings as natural beings. Differing from Fichte, he
does not plead for "absolute independent self- activity." 2 5 But, apart from a certain form of
dependence between human beings and dependence of human beings on nature, for Marx
nothing is more unbearable than to exist through someone else and for somebody else. He
insists that human beings can be independent and free if they owe their existence exclusively
to themselves. 2 6 For this reason the creative and redemptive work of God stand in an
irreconcilable contradiction to the creative work of human beings. The contradiction is not
Feuerbachian: the more one ascribes to God, the less remains for human beings.

The

contradiction is Fichteo-Marxian: the more one depends on God, the less one is free.
Formulated differently: as long as one is in the least way dependent on God, one is not
completely free. The independence of human beings as the only authentic form of their
existence demands that "there be no other [God]" besides them. 2 7
Marx' polemic against God's grace, which rests o n his understanding o f human beings
and their freedom, indicates clearly that his critique of religion is not directed only against
an erroneous concept of God as human beings' parasitic competitor, but against every belief
in God who graciously acts in their favor. In spite of some important disparities between
the God that Marx denies and the God which biblical and authentic Christian traditions
affirm, the object of reflection is in part the same God. Moreover, the common feature in
Marx' and Christians' concept of God (God's grace) is one of the most fundamental
characteristics of the authentic Christian understanding of God.
IV
It is sometimes asserted that Marx' polemic against God's grace does not demand
metaphysical but merely methodological atheism. Marx' atheism would differ from atheism
inherent in the modern sciences in that it dispenses with the "hypothesis God" not only in the

2 4 Ibid., 256.
2 5 Ibid., 249.
2 6Karl Marx, "Okonomische-philosophische Manuskripte," in op.cit., 544.
27 Karl Marx, "Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," in Karl
Marx/Freidrich Engels, Werke, Berlin, 1 977, Erganzungsband I, 262.
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process of the theoretical explanation of the world but also in the process of its practical
change. If one understands Marx' atheism in this fashion, then the purpose of his polemic
against faith in God would be to direct people "so that in their activity, especially in their
sociopolitical activity, they rely on themselves, on their knowledge, on their mutual help and
solidarity." 2 8 Such atheism could be called a "postulate of a practical reason" 29 because its
sole justification is its function of making people depend completely on their own powers.
Belief in God would be unacceptable only insofar as it prevents such self-reliance. But as
long as human beings act as if there were no God, they are free to interpret religiously their
deeds as if they were the result of God's grace:
Such methodological atheism is incompatible with the Christian understanding of
salvation by grace. Salvation takes place "without [human] works," excl�sively "by faith" in
God's work for human beings. 30 Salvation is accomplished by God for human beings
(however, not apart from their subjectivity as those who believe and live in accordance with
their belief) and thus it is and must remain a result of God's grace. Because it is not possible
for salvation to take place as if there were no God, it is not possible for salvation to take
place as if there were no God, it is also impossible merely to interpret it as a result of God's
grace. In relation to the very core of Christian understanding of salvation, i.e. in relation to
Christians becoming and remaining Christian, methodological theism is not the only theology
desirable but indispensable.

Methodological atheism, however, has an important place in

relation to Christian living in the world. As Luther pointed out in his interpretation of Psalm
1 27, God's help and provision does not relieve the people of their own planning and working.
On the contrary, God's provision takes place in that human beings "behave as if there were
no God and as if they had to save themselves and rule by themselves."31
But the question is not only to what extent methodological atheism ( if we assume
metaphysical theism) is compatible with Christian faith, but to what extent methodological
atheism(again if we assume metaphysical theism) is compatible with Marx' humanism? The
second question must be answered in the negative. Marx questions not only God's grace
which helps human beings in their sociopolitical activity, but also the grace of God which
is expressed in the very relation of God as Creator to human beings. The belief in God's
creation is in Marx' view the most radical expression of human dependence on God. In one

28Marko Kersevan, "Atheism: Is it Essential to Marxism?" JES,22( 1 985), 504; cf. Helmut
Gollwitzer, Die marxistische Religionskritik und der christliche Glaube, Gi.itersloh, 1 977, 83.
29Kersevan, op.cit., 505.
30 Romans 3:28
31 Martin Luther, D. Martin Luther's Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Weimar, 1 883ff. XV, 373,
3; cf. Oswald Bayer, Aus Glauben Ieben: Uber Rechtfertigung und Heiligung, Stuttgart, 1 984, 36ff.
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of the most fundamental texts of his whole critique of religion Marx says: "A being does not
regard himself as independent unless he is his own master, and he is only his master when
he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of another considers himself
as a dependent being. But I live completely by another person's grace when I owe to him not
only the continuance of my life but also its creation; when he is its source. My life has
necessarily such a cause outside itself if it is not my own creation."3 2 No matter how strongly
we stress it is desirable that human beings live for themselves (which, except in relation to
salvation, is in a certain sense imperative in Christian theology). The reason is simple, even
what a human being is "through himself he is through God who created him to be such."33
Marx rightly maintains that a being which owes its existence to God "lives completely by
another person's grace."3 4 A person who lives by the grace of another being "does not stand
on his own feet" 3 5 but has a "foreign foundation", which can only mean that in and of itself
it "has no foundation." 3 6 As creatures human beings necessarily praise their creator through
every one of their achievements. As Marx says in "Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts",
instead of confirming (bestatigen) themselves in their action, created human beings are, as
everything "established," "only confirmation of the act of establishing." 37
Since human dependence on God necessarily follows from the acceptance of God as
creator of human beings, Marx' atheism cannot be considered a mere postulate of the
practical mind. Metaphysical atheism as the denial of the objective existence of God the
Creator is the necessary implication of consistent methodological atheism. Marx' humanism
is thus not only a-theistic in the sense that God is simply absent from it, but in the sense that
it is incompatible with the objective existence of God the Creator.
It seems that there are only two ways of conceiving God that could escape Marx' critique
of human dependence on God.
Christian notion of God.

Both would amount to a radical reinterpretation of the

Moreover, the first is inadequate from the perspective of any

religion. Those who declare that atheism is not essential for Marx and Marxism, in that they
suggest precisely these two concepts of God, indirectly confirm the thesis that the denial of
a personal God, Creator and Redeemer, is an essential aspect of Marx' humanism.
3 2Karl Marx, "Okonomische-philosophische Manuskripte,"in og.cit., 544.
33Michael Landman, Fundamental-Anthropologie, Bonn, 1 979, 224.
34 Karl Marx, op.cit., 544.
3 5Ibid.
3 6Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke, ed by Eva ¥oldauer/Karl Markus Michel,
Frankfurt a M., 1 97 1 , XII, 372f.
37Marx, op.cit., 577.
24

It is possible to understand religious consciousness as one of the many forms of human
production, say as a "poetic metaphor."38 In order to come to an understanding of religion
which would be compatible with Marx' humanism, it would in addition be necessary to
differentiate between alienated forms of religious production and those that are "alienated,
creative, human."39 The latter would be an acceptable form of human religious production,
the former not.

The distinction between alienating and human forms of religion is

indispensable for Christian theology; however it is impossible in the context of Marx'
understanding of religion as a human product and his theory of alienation.

Human forms

of religious production would be only those that are immune to his critique of alienation.
The distinction would only be possible within the framework of Marx' thought provided that
.

human beings were aware that the "God" in whom they believe is ( I )their own product (2)to
whom they are not subject but over whom they rule. A " humane God" would thus be a god
without transcendence and without holiness.

As the phenomenon of secular religion

illustrates, religious consciousness is possible without transcendence. The presence of the
holy is, however, constitutive for it. 4 ° For religious consciousness as religious consciousness
it is essential not to include the awareness of ruling the object of religious worship: it is
impossible religiously to relate to a "god" over whom one has power.

Moreover, in the

context of monotheistic religion the very notion of such a "god" is contradictory: a god who
is not the Lord of Lords is not God (irrespective of, for instance, God's lordship being
expressed paradoxically in the form of God's service to and suffering for human beings, as
in Christianity). It seems reasonable to me that Marx did not envisage the possibility of
unalienated forms of religion in an unalienated society, as he did unalienated forms of art. 41
If we do not want to deprive religion of what constitutes it as religion, then, given Marx'
basic paradigm of alienation and emancipation, religion necessarily represents a form of
alienation. 4 2
38Kersevan, op.cit., 504; Esad Cimic, "Marx's Critique of Religion and/or Atheism," JES, 22
( 1 985), 524.
39Skledar and Kukoc, op.cit., 92.
4°Cf. Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the non Rational factor in the Idea
of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational, London/Oxford/New York , l 950; Mircea Eliade,
Geschichte der religiosen Ideen, Freiburg/Basel Wien, 1 978.
41Contra Esad Cimic, "Mogucnosti marksistickog pristupa fenomenu religije" [The Possibility of
a Marxist Approach to the Phenomenon of Religion], in Religija i drustvo [Religion and Society],
Zagreb, 1 98 7 , 32.
4 2A compromise could be attempted: one could deprive religion of the dimension of
transcendence by understanding it as a form of human production, but could respect the dimension
of holiness in religion by allowing it to "claim" human beings as persons (cf. Kersevan, "Mogucnost
religije u Marxovoj misli i suvremenoj marksistickoj praksi" [The Possibility of Religion in Marx'
25

Marx' critique of human dependence on God could be averted by understanding God in
an impersonal way, say as "an infinite open room that challenges and invites, an ever
expanding possibility of newness and future." 43 Such a description of God is compatible with
the attribution of personality to God, but is relevant to the question of the essentiality of
atheism for Marx only if it is taken to imply that God is impersonal. Given an impersonal
God, human dependence on God would be analogous to dependence on nature, which in
Marx view did not call into question the humanness of human beings.

Belief in an

impersonal God could be compatible with Marx' denial of human dependence on God. The
difficulties with the notion of personality when applied to God not withstanding, in Christian
theology personality is an inalienable attribute of God 4 4 because to address God as "Thou"
is constitutive of the Judeo-Christian experience.
v

That the polemic against human dependence on God the Creator and Redeemer-- a
polemic that follows from Marx' thesis that human beings are the highest beings for
themselves--is the cornerstone of Marx' atheism can be demonstrated indirectly by showing
how all the different aspects of Marx' critique of religion can be seen as selections of a
building erected on this cornerstone. A sketch of this demonstration follows.
By arguing that the polemic against God's grace is the unifying center of Marx' thinking
about religion, I am not suggesting that his thinking did not develop during the course of his
life. My contention is that this development does not contain contradictions and ruptures,
which must be ascribed to Marx if one understands the cornerstone of his atheism differently
(except in the case of taking the Feuerbachian dichotomy between God and human beings,
for which the polemic against human dependence on God in integral, to be the foundation
of Marx' atheism).

If, for instance, one maintains that Marx' atheism is merely

methodological, then the reason for his uncompromising polemic against God's grace
expressed in the doctrine of creation is unclear. Or if one maintains that Marx' critique of

Thought and in Contemporary Marxist Practice], Kulturni radnik, 1 5 [ 1 987] 1 37). But since there
can be no holy object over which one can dispose, and since there can be no emancipation in a
Marxian sense without disposing over one's own products (whether material or spiritual), this solution
seems unfortunate both from a theological and from a Marxist standpoint.
43 Jose Miguez Bonino, op.cit., 539.
4 4Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, New York, 1 984, 1 52ff.
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religion relates only to the social function of religion, then orre must assume a rupture in the
development of Marx' critique of religion after his dissertation. 4 5
(l)The fundamentally atheistic thesis that human beings are the highest beings for
themselves is compatible with Marx' understanding of the mechanism of the creation of
religion, according to which religious concepts are a reflection of the alienated reality in
which human beings live. Since human beings are not actually the highest beings, they need
the "fantastic realization of [their] being" in religion as a "festive supplement" for what is
lacking in their everyday lives. 4 6
Moreover, the theory of the social "production" of religion contains a denial of the
existence of the Christian God. True, since the theory does not impl X anything about the
objective existence of God, but only explains the genesis of what is predicated about God
and denies that what is predicated has an objectively existing object of reference, it is not
strictly atheistic but agnostic. But it is atheistic in relation to the Christian God in that it
•

implies that everything Christians ascribe to God and ever could ascribe to him cannot be
taken as attributes of an actually existing being.
(2)The polemic against dependence on God can explain well the importance Marx
ascribes to critique of religion. This polemic is an important presupposition of every other
type of critique for it represents the paradigm for the critique of all other forms of
alienation, especially economic alienation. 4 7 Like religious alienation, these other forms of
alienation are various types of human beings' dependence on their own creations.
(3)My thesis on the foundation of Marx' atheism in his anthropology fits well the way
Marx describes the negative function of religion in society. Acceptance of dependence as
the fundamental characteristic of humans' relation to God corresponds to acceptance of self
despisal and subordination in relation to the world. According to Marx, these are the main
features of the devious behavior that religion, as the opiate of the people, produces. 48
(4)The above-mentioned thesis explains well the (relative) importance Marx ascribes to
the ideological struggle against religion. As can easily be shown from his article, "Zur Kritik
der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," this struggle is important for Marx as an indirect form
of the struggle to overcome human alienation on the political and economic level.

But

religion itself represents also an important (though derivative) form of alienation which

4 5Cf. Skledar and Kukoc, op.cit., 9 1 .
4 6Cf. Karl Marx "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," Marx and Engels, op.cit., 378f.
4 7Cf. Volf, op.cit.
48Cf. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," in op.cit., 378f. Marx, "Komunismus
des 'Rheinischen Beobachters'" in Marx and Engels, Werke, Berlin, 1 977, IV, 200.
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consists in the consciousness of human dependence on God. Besides the social there are thus
also important anthropological reasons why the ideological struggle against religion is an
integral (though not the primary) aspect of the struggle for the humanization of men and
women. I suspect that Marx' "special disgust for Christianity," his desire to "deliver the last
blow to Christianity" and his glorifying the Parisian revolutionaries as "assaulters of
Heaven," 49 can best be explained by his view that the Christian faith is intrinsically and not
only extrinsically alienating.
(5)Taking the critique of dependence on God as the foothold of Marx' atheism fits well
with the fact that Marx criticized religion not only when it hindered social liberation and
social progress, but also when it desired to be an ally of Communists in the realization of
their goals (although dependence on God is not the only reason why Marx rejected so called
"religious communism").
(6)If we take the statement that human beings are the highest beings for themselves as
the foundation of Marx' atheism then we can easily explain the centrality of the critique of
earthly gods in Marx' thought. Earthly and heavenly gods are unacceptable for exactly the
same reason. The demand that "there be no other" god besides human beings necessarily
implies the denial of "all heavenly and earthly gods."50 Marx' refusal to reorient completely
his critique from heavenly to earthly gods does not mean that his atheism is "contradictory",
stretched "between heaven and earth."5 1 On the contrary, it would be inconsistent had he
completed this reorientation, since- - from the perspective of his understanding of religion as
a form of human "production"- - he would have failed to criticize one essential aspect of
human dependence on t heir own creatures. 5 2
(7)Since the actual existence of God the Creator is incompatible with the postulate of
human independence from God, it is understandable why Marx explicitly denied the
existence of God from the beginning of his philosophical development to the end of his life.
In his doctoral dissertation he says that besides human beings ("man") there can be no other
god, 53 and toward the end of his life in an interview of 1871 he explicitly states, "I myself am

49Cf. Veres, "The Ambivalence of Marx's Atheism," 554.
50Marx, "Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," in op.cit., 262.
[Italics mine.]
5 1Veres, "The Ambivalence of Marx's Atheism," 560.
5 2A similar position is made (inconsistently) by Veres in ibid., 554.
5 3Marx, "Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," in op.cit., 262.
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an atheist." 5 4 Throughout his adult life Marx was a "naturalistic materialist" in whose thought
there was "no place for the objective existence of a supernatural being and of otherworldly
powers." 5 5
(8)Marx' atheistic polemic against dependence on God's grace is comparable with an
explicit statement in his early writings that atheism is only a transitory form of human
consciousness. 5 6 The atheism which will not exist in socialism refers to the absence of the
concept of God in the human mind. By its denial of God, atheism as a conscious attitude in
one sense affirms God (namely as the object of denial) and is not appropriate in a state in
which human beings will allegedly be the uncontested highest beings for themselves. As the
critique of idols is unthinkable in the eschatological Kingdom of God, so also is atheism as
a conscious denial of God unthinkable in Marx' kingdom of freedom. On the other hand,
as the objective existence of idols is unthinkable in the Kingdom of God, so also is the
objective existence of God unthinkable in Marx' kingdom of freedom. The atheism that is
essential for Marx' vision of socialism refers to the absence of the objectively existing God.
Such atheism is compatible with the absence of the subjective denial of God.

VI
The above reflection on the essentiality of atheism for Marx allows us to draw certain
conclusions about the compatibility of Christianity and Marxism. Under what conditions is
it possible for Christians to be Marxists?

One can answer this question from two

perspectives. The answer could contain the conditions under which a Christian would be
acceptable to Marxists as a Marxist. Marxists themselves need to answer this question from
this perspective.

A Christian theologian does better to answer it by investigating the

conditions under which a Christian would be acceptable to Christians as a Marxist, or a
Marxist as a Christian. I will take this approach to the question in the final section of this
study.
If the investigation of the essentiality of atheism for Marx and Marxism is placed within
the framework of the question about the conditions under which an individual can be both

5 4Quoted by Jose P. Miranda, Marx Against the Marxists: The Challenge of Humanism of Karl
Marx. London, 1 980, 280.
5 5Skledar, Urn i religi ja, 33 and Kersevan, "Aktualnost Marxove kritike religije danas [The
Relevance of Marx's Critique of Religion Today] Religije i drustvo [Religion and Society], Zagreb,
1 98 7 , 24.
5 6Cf. Marx, "okonomisch-philosophische Manuscripte," op.cit., 546.
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a Christian and a Marxist, then we are striving after a maximum in the relations between
Christians and Marxists. Such an approach has its strengths and weaknesses, which I do not
intend to examine here. In any case, it assumes that the dialogue between Marxists and
Christians and their practical cooperation are both desirable and possible. 5 7
If the previously mentioned arguments are cogent, from the Christian perspective a
Christian can be a Marxist (or a Marxist can be a Christian) only if revisions of Marx' theory
in three important areas are acceptable to Marxists.
(I)Marxists would have to concede that two aspects of Marx' critique of religion are not
essential for Marxism.

First, one would have to consider Marx' theory of projection as

accidental for Marxism. Religion is, no doubt, always historically mediated. Social factors
influence the concrete forms of religious consciousness and it is important to investigate the
character and extent of this influence. But religious consciousness cannot be reduced to an
immediate or mediate reflection of the alienated world.
Second, Marx' general statement about religion as the opiate of the people has to be given
up. It is less appropriate to describe the authentic Christian faith as an "opium, lulling people
with the promise of an afterlife" than as "a cup of coffee for the present." 58 This does not
mean that Marx' critique of reactionary forms of the Christian faith is irrelevant. The
biblical examples of the "divine critique of alienating worship" 59 shows that Marx's critique
becomes indispensable the moment Christian faith abandons its task of serving concrete
people.
(2)0ne important aspect of Marx' anthropology needs to be revised. Marx' persuasion
of the incompatibility of dependence on God's grace and human freedom must be taken as
an accidental element of Marxist humanism. Marx himself prepared the way for such a
broader understanding of humanism by considering certain forms of human dependence on
nature and society compatible with human freedom. 60 But, of course, not all forms of human
dependence on God are acceptable. There are alienating forms of human dependence on God
which one must criticize in the name of God's holiness and human dignity. Furthermore,
dependence on the one true God cannot justify dependence on various secular gods. On the

5 70n the conditions for cooperation between Christians and Marxists cf. Srdjan Vrcan, "The
Essentiality or Nonessentiality of Atheism in Marxism: Is it so Crucial?" JES, 22 ( I 985), 542ff.
58So Jiirgen Moltmann in Miroslav Volf, "An Interview with Jiirgen Moltmann" in Communities
of Faith and Radical Discipleship. Macon, 1 986, 1 0.
59Cf. Miroslav Volf, "'I znam da sunce ne boji se tame': Teoloske meditacije o Santicevu vjerskom
pjesnistvu," ['I Know that the Sun is not Afraid of the Darkness': Theological Meditations on the
Poetry of Aleksa Santic] Zagreb/Osijek, 1 986, 57f.
60 Ibid., section III.
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contrary, with respect to secular divinities only an atheist; we must insist, can be a good
Christian. 61 In the name of exclusive dependence on the one true God we must reject ali
sacralization of secular realities.
(3)As regards Marx' theory of emancipation, Marxists have to give up the requirement
of methodological atheism in ali spheres of human life. Such atheism is incompatible with
some central aspects of the Christian doctrine of salvation. The keys of human salvation are
not in human hands. Hence the hope of human salvation cannot be only a hope in human
efforts but above ali hope in the "liberating transcendence of God's grace." 6 2 Such a hope,
however, demands active human involvement in carrying out socio-economic liberation.
Further, in order to speak meaningfully from a Christian perspective about Christians
who are Marxists (and vice versa), Marxists need to consider the absence of the consciousness
of God as a marginal element of emancipated humanity. The consciousness of God as the
subjective side of God's objective "dweiiing" among the people of God (cf. Revelation 21:3)
is an inalienable characteristic of Christian eschatological hope.

Indeed, the conscious

relation to God, described often in the Christian tradition as "vision" and "enjoyment" of
God, is the final goal of human existence. 63
If the divergences from Marx' own views stated above were accepted as legitimately
Marxist, then Christian faith and Marxism would not be separated by an unbridgeable gap.
Whether or not Christians would become Marxists in this case would depend primarily on the
persuasiveness of Marxism as an analysis and theory of social life. In any case, the Christian
faith as such would not hinder Christians from becoming Marxists.

61Cf. Ernst Bloch, Atheismus in Christentum:
Frankfurt a. M. 1 968, 1 5.

Zur Religion des Exodus und des Reiches.

6 2Jan Milic Lachman, "Christ and/or Prometheus: Theological Issues in the Encounter Between
Christians and Marxists," JES, 22 ( 1 985), 45 1 .
63Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III. Providence, Notre Dame, London,
1 975, LI-LVII; John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion. Philadelphia, 1 977, III, 25, I 0.
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